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Behavioral economic research has tended to ignore the role of cultural 
differences in economic decision-making.  The authors suggest that a systematic 
bias affects existing behavioral economic theory-- cognitive biases are often 
assumed to be universal.  To examine how cultural background informs economic 
decision-making, and to test framing effects, morality effects, and out-group effects 
in a cross-cultural study, the authors conducted an experiment in the United States 
and China.  The experiment was designed to test cultural and cognitive effects on a 
fundamental economic phenomenon-- how people estimate the financial values of 
objects over time.   
 
Results of the experiment demonstrated dramatic cultural differences in 
financial value estimations, as well as on the influence of variables such as 
framing effects.  Chinese participants made higher object value estimates than 
Americans did, even when adjusting for differing national inflation rates.  In 
addition, the results showed that contextual information, such as framing, morality 
information, and group membership affected judgments of financial values in 
complex ways, particularly for Chinese participants.  The results underscore the 
importance of understanding the influence of cultural background on economic 
decision-making.  The authors discuss the results in the context of behavioral law 
and economics, and propose that importing cultural competence into behavioral 
models can lead to cognitive debiasing, both temporary and permanent.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that all people, across nations, 
cultures, and backgrounds make economic judgments in essentially the same 
way.  In the past three decades, psychological and behavioral economic 
research have demonstrated that people depart quite frequently and 
systematically from the neoclassical economic model. 1  This behavioral 
critique of rational economic choice has been embraced by many disciplines, 
including by scholars in the field of behavioral law and economics.2  Even with 
the prospering of the behavioral critique of rational economics, however, most 
researchers (including those advocating for an accurate behavioral model) still 
adhere to universalistic assumptions.  That is, they assume that if a cognitive 
bias or heuristic will cause deviation from rational economic decision-making, 
all people will be susceptible to that bias and deviate in their decision-making.  
As a result, the potential that cultural differences systematically influence 
economic decision-making has generally been overlooked by economists and 
behavioralists alike.3 
                                                 
1 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk , 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  See also  George Loewenstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP . 181 (1989);  RICHARD E.  
NISBETT & LEE D. ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT (1980). 
2 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.  REV. 1471 (1998).  See also Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
89 (1995);  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal 
Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003). 
3 Although most scholars continue to overlook cultural differences in their behavioral 
assumptions, a few have called attention to systematic cultural differences in a variety of 
behavioral assumptions.  Projects that linked culture to behavioral economics have 
included those by Licht and Mitchell. See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of all Path 
Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-
Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. OF INT’L L. 195 (2004);  
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Gregory 
Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST . L. REV. 1065.  See also  Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 CHI. L. REV. 207 
(2006); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
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If culture systematically affects economic decision-making, behavioral 
and financial models should adjust to recognize the importance of culture.  
Making such an adjustment requires not just treating cultural differences as 
simple triggers of individual differences4 or as biases themselves to be removed 
through a problem-solution debiasing framework.5  Instead, incorporating 
cultural knowledge requires that culture be recognized both as a cause of 
diverse decision-making and as a prescriptive tool that can help facilitate 
behavioral predictions and legal reform efforts.  Along these prescriptive lines, 
consider a biological analogy-- scientists have unearthed new potential cures 
for disease simply by investigating biological and genetic diversity across 
cultural groups.6  These studies have shown that elements of diversity may 
contain clues that can be used to understand vulnerabilities in some groups.7  
Exploring the cultural foundations of fundamental economic decision-making 
may similarly reveal clues that would assist both economic and financial 
modeling, as well as debiasing efforts.   
This Article critiques a behavioral economics field that has traditionally 
ignored cultural variation, and argues that cross-cultural learning can teach us 
not only how to avoid cognitive biases, but also how to build accurate legal and 
behavioral models.  We make two primary claims.  First, we argue that 
behavioral models should recognize the systematic influence of culture on 
                                                                                                                            
Risk , 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006).  Kahan and his colleagues’ model brings a focus on 
cultural preferences to decision-making theory.  We believe, however, that the cultural 
preferences discussed by Kahan and his colleagues are distinguishable from the cross-
cultural influences on thought that we describe.  See infra note [77].  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006).   
4 Some recent scholarship in behavioral law and economics recognizes that individual 
differences play a role in bias susceptibility.  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).  Though they do not specifically 
discuss cultural differences, Jolls and Sunstein do address how individuals with different 
bias susceptibilities would be affected by their model.      
5 Debiasing literature has not suggested that culture may contain debiasing clues.  See, 
e.g. Boris Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1982).  For a thorough discussion of debiasing in the 
law, see Jolls & Sunstein, supra  note __ (arguing for debiasing through changes to 
substantive law). Existing models of debiasing generally make the same universalistic 
assumptions as behavioral economics.  
6 See David B. Goldstein & Gianpiero L. Cavalleri, Understanding Human Diversity, 
437 NATURE , October 27, 2005, at 1241 (discussing how gene variants may be used to 
better understand potential cures for genetically influenced diseases).  Also relevant to 
discussions of diversity and biological solutions is research indicating that biological 
diversity may serve to reduce risks of disease.  See, e.g . Biodiversity May Reduce Lyme 
Disease, SCIENCE DAILY, June 8, 2000, available at 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2000/06/000608074403.htm (last visited, April 20, 
2006). 
7 Id. 
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economic decision-making.  Second, we propose that cultural knowledge 
should be an integral part of debiasing solutions.  To make these claims, it is 
first necessary to illustrate that culture does in fact influence economic 
decisions.  We pursued this challenge by employing an empirical study across 
cultures that tested both financial value estimations and contextual variables 
common to social psychological discourse.  We specifically chose to test 
financial estimations8 because of their fundamental importance to economic 
analysis.  Our results indicate not only that economic decision-making varies 
systematically across cultures, but also that members of different cultures react 
to situational variables in divergent ways.9   
We have organized this Article as follows:  In Section II, we review the 
importance of economic decision-making in today’s financial and legal worlds, 
and situate this importance against a backdrop of globalization with an Asia 
focus.  After establishing the practical economic and theoretical reasons for 
studying economic decision-making across cultures, we detail the social and 
cognitive bases of our claims, relying primarily on cultural psychological 
theory.  Cultural psychology has theoretically, and in some cases explicitly, 
given us reason to think that cultural competency is integral to behavioral 
models.  We then review existing behavioral economic and legal discourse.  
We point out that although cultural psychology has recently been recognized in 
a few discussions of legal policy, most scholarship continues to overlook its 
powerful influences.  Furthermore, scholarship in debiasing also overlooks 
culture as a potential solution tool.   
In Section III, we detail our empirical project, from predictions to 
results.  To test our theory that culture influences economic decision-making in 
a variety of systematic ways, we conducted an empirical investigation of 
financial value estimations across cultures, and examined how these 
estimations might be susceptible to a variety of contextual factors.  Our results 
indicate that Americans and Chinese make vastly different fundamental 
economic assumptions in making financial value estimations.  In addition, the 
results show that contextual variables (such as framing) have different effects 
based on the participant’s culture.  These results reinforce the conclusion that 
culture is an important factor in decision-making.  Section IV connects the 
                                                 
8 As will become clear in our empirical study, infra Section III, when we refer to 
“financial estimations” we are referring to laypersons’ judgments of the actual value of a 
given object (such as a gold ring).  Note that this focus on financial estimations varies 
slightly with behavioral economic studies that focus more on the utility of an object’s value 
than on the actual value itself.  We chose to test financial estimations rather than utility 
judgments because we believed that value estimations are more fundamental economic 
judgments, and we desired to begin our empirical investigation by looking at the most 
fundamental economic measures.    
9 In addition to our empirical study, we discuss existing cross-cultural research on 
cognitive biases, infra Section II C.  
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study’s results to behavioral economic and legal discourse, and proposes that 
culture should be incorporated into economic decision-making models.  If 
economic decision-making (and cognitive biases) vary systematically across 
cultures, then behavioral economic models must either incorporate cultural 
variables or specifically acknowledge the cultural limitations of those models.  
Section V proposes the concept of debiasing through cultural competency.  We 
suggest two ways in which cultural competency can help us better understand 
and solve deviations from rational economic thought:  through cultural training 
and through model building.  Section VI offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
 II. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN A DIVERSE AND INTERCONNECTED WORLD 
 
A.  Global Economic Development and Financial Judgments   
Understanding the essence of how people make financial judgments 
has worldwide significance.  For centuries economists, businesspeople, 
politicians, and scholars have relied on economic and financial assumptions 
when generating theory, crafting laws and developing policy. 10  Only in the 
past few decades, however, have psychologists discovered the roles of 
cognitive forces in economic decision-making.11  These discoveries, embodied 
by the fields of behavioral economics and behavioral finance,12 added a human 
component to models of economic decision-making at a time when the world’s 
business marketplace was rapidly becoming globally interconnected and 
diverse.13  In the years since Kahneman and Tversky unveiled their early 
findings,14 behavioral economics has prospered and the world’s economy has 
continued to diversify, with eyes shifting east to China, an emerging economic 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
11 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra  note [1]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On 
the Psychology of Prediction. 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). 
12 In this Article, we focus primarily on behavioral economic claims.  However, we 
believe that our claims, and in particular our empirical study’s results, apply to behavioral 
finance as well.  For more on behavioral finance, see, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002);  
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1400 (2001); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. 
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).    
13 See SMART GLOBALIZATION: DESIGNING GLOBAL STRATEGIES, CREATING GLOBAL 
NETWORKS (Anil K. Gupta & D. Eleanor Westney, eds., 2003); Theodore Levitt, The 
Globalization of Markets, HARVARD BUS. REV., May 01, 1983 (providing a provocative 
perspective on globalization). See also  Nanette S. Levinson & Minoru Asahi, Cross-
National Strategic Alliances and Interorganizational Learning , 24 ORGANIZATIONAL 
DYNAMICS 50 (1995) 
14 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra  note [1]; Kahneman & Tversky, supra  note [11]; 
Tversky & Kahneman, supra  note [11]. 
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force.15  Yet, despite the simultaneous emergence of behavioral economics and 
economic globalization with an East Asian focus, economists, psychologists, 
and legal scholars have only begun to explore how cultural forces affect 
financial decision-making in systematic and predictable ways.  Such an 
exploration reveals not only that people make economic judgments and 
financial estimations in systematically different ways across cultural groups, 
but also that understanding cultural differences themselves may help debiasing 
efforts.  
 
B.  Cognitive Deviations from Economic Rationality 
The history of behavioral economics has illuminated fascinating 
deviations from utility theory, but its theories are rarely tested in a cross-
cultural setting.  Notwithstanding its culturally universal assumptions, 
“prospect theory” has been widely accepted as a behavioral-based alternative to 
expected utility theory.16  Prospect theory, and behavioral economics more 
generally, explain why decision-makers systematically deviate from 
economically rational models.17  For example, the endowment effect illustrates 
that the perceived value of an object increases when a person owns it.18  
Tversky and Kahneman also found that losses are considered by people to be 
more important than equivalent gains.19  They explained that losses loom 
bigger than gains psychologically because they seem more powerful, more 
likely to take place, and appear more significant in affecting the future.20 
Another economic bias, the money illusion effect, shows that people 
tend to focus more on nominal values than real values.21  For instance, people 
                                                 
15 See, e.g . CHINA’S CENTURY:  THE AWAKENING OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC 
POWERHOUSE (Laurence J. Brahm ed., 2001);  ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY : 
THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE 
OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (2005); James Kynge, A Tireless Powerhouse in the Region: 
Trade in China, FIN. TIMES (U.K. ed.), Oct. 16, 2001; China, Coming Out, THE 
ECONOMIST , Mar. 23, 2006.   
16 See, e.g. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD (2001);  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (C. Sunstein, ed. 2000); Chris 
Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003).  
17 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra  note __.  See also  Jolls et al, supra  note __.   
18 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note __.  See also Korobkin, supra  note __; Jennifer 
Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2002).  
 
19 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and The Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
20 Id.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for 
Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 627 (1996). 
21 See Eldar Shafir et al., Money Illusion, 112 Q. J.  ECON. 341 (1997).  See also 
Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of Information, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 
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react more favorably to a 2% salary raise in times of 4% inflation than to a 2% 
salary cut in times of no inflation, even when they are aware of all relevant 
information.  A study of this effect was conducted by Raghubir and 
Srivastava,22 who tested how people understand and mentally calculate the 
economic basis of currency exchange and value.23  They found that, consistent 
with the money illusion effect, people’s spending behavior is a function of the 
relationship between the face value (nominal value) of the foreign currency and 
their home currency.  This is true, they hypothesized, because an individual 
forms an initial judgment by anchoring on a more salient and easy to use 
attribute, such as the face value of the currency, and then adjusts that initial 
judgment to reflect other remaining attributes.24  
Legal scholars have done well to incorporate a vast array of 
psychological factors into legal fields that are heavily influenced by economic 
models.25  These proponents of behavioral economics have recognized that 
neoclassical economic models of legal efficiency fail to accurately predict 
human behavior.26  As a result, over the past decade, commentators have 
critiqued a wide spectrum of legal rules.27  This work has had a broad impact 
on legal scholarship.28  Influential works have emerged from some of the 
nation’s top legal minds, including in the areas of contract law29, tort law30, 
                                                                                                                            
715 (2003) (reviewing ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2003)). 
22 Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of Face Value on Monetary Valuation 
in Foreign Currences, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 335 (2002). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. See also Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase 
Quantity Decisions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 71 (1998). 
25 See Jolls et al, supra  note __; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra  note __.   
26 See id.  See also  Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Dan 
Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L.  
REV. 511 (2004).  
27 See Langevoort, supra  note __. 
28 See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 115 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051 (2000). 
29 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default 
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Oren Bar-Gill & 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an ‘Irrational’ Breach of Contract, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 143 (2004); Christine Jolls , Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective 
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997); Linda Babcock et al., Biased 
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining , 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995); Linda Babcock & 
Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 
341 (1999). 
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property law31, criminal law32, corporate and securities law33, discrimination 
law34, and punitive damages35, among others.  These works typically critique a 
substantive legal area’s economic assumptions by describing a more accurate 
understanding of human behavior.  Other influential works begin not with a 
broad legal area but with a cognitive bias, and work from there, pointing out its 
influence on either a specific topic or a range of legal topics.  These works have 
                                                                                                                            
30 See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications 
for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT . ECON. REV. 125 (2004); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas 
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 NYU. 
L.  REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999); Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market 
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000). 
31 See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of 
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice 
between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from 
Behavioral Studies, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 219 (2001); Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, 
Incentives to Create Under a "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons from a 
Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft , 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 
(2002)(focusing on intellectual property analysis). 
32 See Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: 
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime , 1 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 276 (1999); Ehud Guttel, Overcorrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 241 (2004); Tom Baker et al., 
The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 
(2004). 
33 See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and 
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool , 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 
101 (1997); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005); 
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink , 71 U. CIN L. REV. 
1233 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms 
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO L. J. 797 
(2001); Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations 
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge & 
G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does - 
Boundedly): Rules of Thumb In Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002);  
Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities 
Fraud Litigation , 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
34 See Cass Sunstein & Christine Jolls, The Law of Implicit Bias, (unpublished 
manuscript, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897553); See also  Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005)(focusing on research in social 
cognition rather than behavioral economics). 
35 See PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (Cass R. Sunstein et al., eds. 2002);  
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law),” 107 YALE L. J. 2071 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of 
Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001). 
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included projects covering the hindsight bias36, the endowment effect37, 
framing effects38, the overconfidence effect39 and others40.    
Though behavioral economic research has tested the influence of a 
large number of situational and contextual influences on decision-making, 
there still remain other documented influences on thought that have generally 
been overlooked in the context of financial decision-making.  These influences 
not only may affect financial decision-making, but are likely to fluctuate in 
importance across cultures.  For example, the in-group/out-group bias shows 
how people tend to give the benefit to members of their own group .41  Though 
this bias has been applied considerably in the legal context42, its effects on 
traditional economic judgments (such as the financial value of objects) have 
not been tested.   
Another bias-like mechanism is the effect of morality information on 
decision-making.  This effect, as demonstrated by the principle of “culpable 
causation”, indicates that people are more likely to attribute the cause of an 
action to a low moral actor compared to a high moral actor.43  Alicke showed, 
for example, that Americans are more likely to attribute causal blame for a car 
accident to drug dealing drivers (compared to good husband drivers), even 
when the morality of the drivers was unrelated to the accident.44  Though 
                                                 
36 See Rachlinski, supra  note __.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Mechanisms 
of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715 
(2003). Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature 
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 1277 (1999); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical 
Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 
587 (1994). 
37 See Korobkin supra  note __; Arlen et al., supra  note __.  
38 See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. 
CHI L. REV. 163 (2000); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive 
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property 
Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797 
(2005). 
39 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1569 (2000); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: 
Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA ST . U. L. REV. 
673 (2005)(discussing overconfidence effects on CEO’s). 
40 See April M. Perry, Comment:  Guilt by Saturation:  Media Liability for Third-Party 
Violence and the Availability Heuristic, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1045 (2003).   
41 Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A 
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307  (1979). 
42 See Anthony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the 
Peremptory Challenge , 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and 
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005).  
43 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation,  63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 
(1992). 
44 Id.  
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culpable causation is well documented and has also been incorporated into 
legal scholarship,45 it has been generally overlooked in the financial arena, 
perhaps due to a perceived incompatibility between morality and economic 
decisions.   
Due to their influence on causal attributions and responsibility 
judgments, however, one might hypothesize that out-group bias and morality 
effects could similarly affect the way people judge the financial value of 
objects.  For example, a person might estimate the financial value of an object 
differently based on whether the possessor of the object is an in-group or out-
group member (even when objective anchors are held constant).  In addition, 
because these effects have been shown to vary across cultures,46 they might 
serve to illustrate how financial estimates are made differently across cultures.  
 
C.  Cultural Psychology and Biases across Cultures 
Despite the great strides psychologists and behavioral economists 
have taken in identifying deviations from rational economic thought, 
scholars often fail to investigate whether cross-cultural differences could 
illustrate that deviations from rational economic thought are less than 
universal. Because most of the evidence on human rationality (or 
irrationality) is based on theories and evidence developed by Western 
scholars, assumptions generated by these scholars may themselves be 
affected by culturally guided assumptions about human minds, desires and 
rationality.  
Cultural psychology, the study of how culture affects the way people 
think, has recently challenged many previously universalistic assumptions 
regarding human behavior.47 For instance, the fundamental attribution error 
had previously been assumed to be a universal bias.  However, mounting cross-
cultural psychological evidence suggests that the fundamental attribution error 
may be more an effect of American individualist tendencies than a universal 
phenomenon.48   Recent studies by Nisbett, Peng, and their colleagues have 
                                                 
45 See Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama , 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741 
(1999-2000); Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts:  A 
Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 
13 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195 (2004). 
46 See Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Collective Causal Inquiries:  How Culture-
Specific Theories of Agency Affect Culpable Causation and Legal Judgments (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author, 2006)(empirically examining culpable causation across 
culture in legal scenarios). 
47 Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology - What Is It, in CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(James W. Stigler et al.  eds., 1990). 
48 See Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 
46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984). See also Michael Morris & Kaiping 
Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical 
Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949 (1994). 
28-Apr-06 Valuing Cultural Differences 11 
revealed significant cognitive differences between individuals from East Asia 
and people of Western European cultural descent, typically in the United 
States.49 These scholars have attempted to categorize the cognitive differences 
found in those cultural regions as either 'analytic' or 'holistic.'50  Many studies 
have shown that, relative to one another, Americans tend to focus on the 
dispositions of objects (using ‘analytic’ cognitive patterns that might derive 
from Greek philosophy) while Chinese tend to focus on contextual background 
(using ‘holistic’ patterns that might derive from Chinese philosophy) in 
reasoning processes and making judgments.51 
Though cultural psychologists have concerned themselves more with 
cognitive theories of culture than economic judgments, their work can be (and 
sometimes has been) applied to a behavioral economic framework.  Here, we 
briefly review some of the fundamental biases and heuristics in behavioral 
economic literature, and describe how these biases function across Eastern and 
Western cultures.  In most cases, sufficient work has been done so that we can 
report limited results indicating how these biases systematically operate across 
cultures.  Our review illustrates not only that culture influences economic 
decision-making and cognitive biases, but also that it forms a complex 
framework from which one can meaningfully analyze economic decision-
making.  It also demonstrates that many more studies need to be conducted. 
Risk tolerance preferences emerge as one clear source of cultural 
differences.  In a series of studies, Weber and Hsee examined cultural 
differences in risk preference (e.g., choosing between a smaller sure gain 
versus a larger but more risky gain).52 They found that Chinese were more risk 
seeking than Americans.53  However, this difference was found to be specific 
to the financial domain.54  In the socia l domain, the pattern was reversed.55  
                                                 
49 See Li-Jun Ji et al, Culture, Change, and Prediction, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 450 (2001); 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT : HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS 
THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND WHY (2003); Richard E. Nisbett & Takahiko Masuda, Culture 
and Point of View, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 11163 (2003); Richard E. Nisbett et 
al., Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition , 108 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 291 (2001). 
50 See  Nisbett, et al., supra  note __. 
51 See Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning About 
Contradiction, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST  741 (1999). See also  Kaiping Peng et al, Naïve 
Dialecticism and the Tao of Chinese Thought, in  THE HANDBOOK OF INDIGENOUS AND 
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 247 (U. Kim et al. eds., 2006). 
52 Elke U. Weber & Christopher K. Hsee, Models and Mosaics: Investigation of 
Cultural Differences in Risk Perception and Risk Preference. 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & 
REV. 611 (1999).  See also  Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, Cross-National 
Differences in Risk Preferences and Lay Predictions for the Differences. 12 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 165 (1999). 
53 Id. 
54 In the financial domain, participants were asked to choose between two options 
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Chinese were found to be less risk seeking.  Congruent cultural differences also 
emerged when the authors analyzed the risk seeking (or risk avoiding) advice 
implied in Chinese and American proverbs, suggesting deep cultural roots in  
risk preference.56   
Two studies conducted by psychologists in China challenge the cultural 
universality of framing effects and tend to indicate that framing effects operate 
in complex ways across cultures.  Xiao Tian Wang found that Chinese were 
not affected by the framing in traditional Tversky and Kahneman paradigms, 
but when the numbers used in the study were increased to larger figures, 
Chinese started to demonstrate framing effects.57  In another study, Ming Wang 
and her colleagues tested framing effects in six different risk judgments in the 
US and China.58  Results indicated that framing effects persisted across 
cultures, but that in five of the six risk judgment scenarios, effects were 
stronger for Americans than for Chinese.  Wang and her colleagues explained 
these results by referencing different societal beliefs about risk management.  
Psychologists have yet to test how framing effects operate across cultures in 
non-risk domains, such as financial value estimations.  Societal beliefs about 
risk management, however, would not likely translate to financial judgments 
when risk is not an issue.   
A counter- intuitive cultural difference between Eastern and Western 
people is Asian overconfidence in probability judgments. Wright and Phillips 
carried out the first cross-cultural comparison between Chinese and British 
participants on probability judgments,59 and found that the British had a greater 
tendency to view the world in terms of uncertainty than did Hong Kong 
Chinese. British people were more likely to ascribe different degrees of 
uncertainty to events, and could then express the uncertainty as a numerical 
probability in response to general knowledge questions.  Chinese, on the other 
hand, were more likely to make extreme probability estimations (e.g., "100%" 
or "no chance").60 These findings have been confirmed by more recent 
experiments undertaken in the United States, Japan, China, and other Asian 
                                                                                                                            
involving financial instruments such as lottery tickets or shares of stock. Id. 
55 In the social domain, participants were asked to choose between two options 
involving social relationships, such as meeting new friends. Id.  
56 Id. Hsee and Weber also found that the cultural differences in the financial domain 
were mediated by the larger size and better quality of the Chinese participants’ social 
networks. It should also be noted that the cultural differences were found to result from 
different perceptions of the riskiness of the choices, not from different risk-value tradeoffs. 
57 Xiao Tian Wang, Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68(2) 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 145 (1996). 
58  Ming Wang et al., Culture, Dialectics and The Effect of Framing, Paper Presented 
at the International Congress of Psychology in Beijing (2004). 
59 George N. Wright & Lawrence D. Phillips, Cultural Variation in Probabilistic 
Thinking: Alternative Ways of Dealing with Uncertainty, 15 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 239 (1980). 
60 Id. 
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countries.61  Yates and his colleagues suggested that Chinese participants' 
overconfidence may arise from the fact that Chinese usually generate fewer 
counter-arguments in making judgments.62 
Carnevale theorized that the endowment effect63 may not influence 
people from collectivistic cultures because of their emphasis on group 
ownership rather than on individual ownership.64  Applying the cultural 
psychological theory of individualism and collectivism,65 Carnevale studied 
how adjusting an ownership variable (e.g. presenting property as either 
individually or group-owned) affected judgments in individualistic and 
collectivistic individuals.66  He found that collectivist people displayed a 
“group endowment effect,” but not the traditional (individual) endowment 
effect.  These results indicate that endowment effects are culturally sensitive.  
However, it is important to note that Carnevale’s study was conducted solely 
on Americans that were classified as  individualistic or collectivistic.  The 
study did not actually test the endowment effect across cultures.  We will 
discuss such a possibility in the context of debiasing, infra Section V. 
Three cross-cultural studies have compared how hindsight bias 
functions across Far Eastern and Western cultures, revealing mixed results. 
Heine and Lehman found that Japanese and Canadians exhibited similar 
hindsight biases under some instructions, but that Canadians showed a 
marginally more pronounced bias than Japanese under other instructions.67  
The researchers observed that while both cultures in their study exhibited 
some hindsight bias, Canadians demonstrated stronger effects than Japanese 
when they were presented with self-enhancing memory opportunities.68  
                                                 
61 J. Frank Yates, et al., General Knowledge Overconfidence: Cross-national 
Variations, Response Style, and "Reality". 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 87 (1997); J. Frank Yates et al., Beliefs About Overconfidence, Including its 
Cross-National Variation. 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 138 
(1996). 
62 Id.  Such a culture-specific characteristic may have roots in Chinese educational 
practices. In Chinese classrooms, teachers do not encourage questions or criticisms of 
textbooks and lectures, whereas the development of critical thinking is central to the 
ideology of American education. 
63 See Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39 (1980); W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and 
Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?  81(3) AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991). 
64 Peter J. Carnevale, Property, Culture, and Negotiation , in NEGOTIATION AS A 
SOCIAL PROCESS (R. Kramer & D. M. Messick, eds., 1995). 
65 See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM (1995); Tahira M. 
Probst et al., Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas.  77 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 171 (1999). 
66 Id.  
67 Steven J. Heine & Darrin R. Lehman, Hindsight Bias: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, 35 
JAPANESE J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 317 (1996). 
68 Id. 
14 Levinson & Peng 28-Apr-06 
 A study done by Choi and Nisbett, however, cuts in the opposite 
direction from Heine and Lehman’s findings.  Choi and Nisbett found that 
East Asians are less likely than Americans to experience surprise, and will 
therefore display more hindsight bias.69  Pohl and colleagues tested 
hindsight bias globally using internet participants from Asia, Australia, 
Europe, and North America.70  Their study revealed hindsight bias of 
varying degrees across samples. German and Dutch participants, however, 
demonstrated no hindsight bias whatsoever.71 
Taken together, cross-cultural studies have frequently shown that 
cultural differences emerge in complex, yet systematic ways.  Our analysis of 
their findings also shows, however, that existing cross cultural findings have 
still only scratched the surface of developing a competent cross-cultural model 
of decision-making.  Nonetheless, the importance of understanding cultural 
influences on thought emerges as a clear theme for those who want to create 
accurate decision-making models. 
 
D.  Cultural Psychology in Legal Discourse 
Cultural psychology’s emergence has only recently begun to appear in 
legal scholarship.  Licht and Mitchell were among the first commentators to 
discuss cultural psychology generally in the context of behavioral law and 
economics, each sounding a caution to legal scholars that cognitive 
assumptions are not stable.72  Levinson, Peng and Wang critiqued certain 
fundamental aspects of contract formation, and argued that Western models of 
contract may not be appropriate for diverse understandings of contractual 
interactions.73  Levinson and Peng applied specific cultural psychological 
principles to substantive legal inquiries, and analyzed how culture influences 
decision-making in judgments of causation and foreseeability.74  Levinson 
tested mental state attributions across cultures and found that such attributions 
vary across cultures in ways that do not match legal assumptions.75  Rachlinski 
                                                 
69 Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Holistic 
Theories and Recognition of Contradiction, 79 J.  PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 890 
(2000). 
70 Rudiger Pohl et al., Hindsight Bias Around the World, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 270 (2002). 
71 Id. 
72 See Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, supra note __; Licht, The Mother of all Path 
Dependencies, supra note __; Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note __.   Mitchell’s 
discussion of cultural psychology included consideration of overconfidence effects across 
culture. See also  Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, supra  note __. 
73 Justin D. Levinson, Kaiping Peng & Lei Wang, Let’s Make a Deal:  Understanding 
the Cultural Psychological Basis of Contract Formation  (2003) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the authors). 
74 Levinson & Peng, supra note __. 
75 Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:  How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore 
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acknowledged the importance of cultural differences while discussing legal 
paternalism and intervention relating to cognitive biases, citing research 
indicating that people from certain collectivist cultures are more willing to take 
risky gambles.76  Though legal scholars have begun to understand the 
importance of cultural psychology in the law, and cultural differences have 
recently entered discussions of risk preferences,77 behavioral economists and 
legal scholars have yet to sufficiently incorporate cultural differences into 
economic and financial decision-making models.78   
 
E.  Predictions Connecting Cultural Psychology and Behavioral 
Economics:  Studying Financial Estimates of Object Values 
In applying cultural psychological theory to economic judgments, one 
might expect that cross-cultural differences would manifest in the ways people 
                                                                                                                            
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L. J. 601 
(2005)(arguing for culturally competent legal rules). 
76   Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, supra note __, citing Elke U. Weber & Christopher Hsee, 
Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, but Cross-Cultural Similarities in Attitudes 
Towards Perceived Risk , 44 MGMT. SCI. 1205, 1208 (1998). 
77 Kahan et al., supra  note __.  Kahan and his colleagues use a concept that they call 
“cultural cognition” to critique Cass Sunstein’s book, focusing primarily on cultural 
preferences and their influences on risk perception.  “Cultural cognition,” as used by Kahan 
and his colleagues, is distinguishable from the psychological field of “culture and 
cognition.”  See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing:  A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 
(2006)(responding to this critique).  Sunstein argues that Kahan and his colleagues’ 
“cultural cognition” model “is largely a result of bounded rationality, not an alternative to 
it.”  Whether or not Sunstein’s criticism of Kahan and his colleagues’ model of “cultural 
cognition” is correct, we do not believe that such a criticism would apply to our model, 
which rests on more traditional conceptions of “culture and cognition” from the field of 
cultural psychology.  We do not argue that cultural psychology provides us with an 
alternative to bounded rationality.  Instead, we argue that it should inform bounded 
rationality and offer solutions to it.  For more on the cultural psychological field of “culture 
and cognition,” a sub-field of cultural psychology, see Richard E. Nisbett & Ara 
Norenzayan, Culture and Cognition, in STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: COGNITION 561 (D. L. Medin ed., 3rd ed. 2001); Richard E. Nisbett et al., 
supra note __; Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames & Eric Knowles, Culture and Human 
Inference, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 245 (D. Matsumoto ed., 2001).  
Culture and cognition projects have grown in cultural psychology over the past decade, 
including the establishment of a culture and cognition program at the University of 
Michigan (and elsewhere).   
78 Although the authors argue for a culturally competent model of behavioral 
economics, we do not believe that cultural psychologists have nothing to learn from 
economists.  In fact, much of the previous work in cultural psychology has simply focused 
on people’s reactions to laboratory cognitive tasks.  Rather than continue to focus on the 
laboratory setting, cultural psychologists should test the role of cultural differences in 
meaningful aspects of everyday behavior, in which individuals enact their culturally-
influenced cognitive styles. Risk analysis is one area where studies have begun to bridge 
laboratory and everyday reality.  See Rachlinski supra  note __.   
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estimate the financial value of objects.  More specifically, because Americans 
have been shown to be more object focused than East Asians (as illustrated by 
the fundamental attribution error), it would be reasonable to predict that 
Americans will be less sensitive to contextual or situational information 
provided about an object’s surroundings, and will be more likely to make 
financial judgments based upon assumed intrinsic object values.  On the other 
hand, because Chinese have been shown to be more situation focused than 
Americans, one might expect that they would judge the financial value of an 
object in a manner more consistent with contextual cues.  As a result, one could 
predict that two cross-cultural effects would emerge in a cross-cultural study of 
financial value estimation.  First, Chinese would be more sensitive than 
Americans to the economic and social context of the objects.  Specifically, 
when the financial value of an object is being measured over time, Chinese 
would be more likely to incorporate social and economic factors into value 
estimations during the time period being referenced.  Second, Chinese would 
be more sensitive than Americans to independent variables that manipulate 
aspects of context or situation (such as framing the object as lost or found, or 
varying the morality of a person that possesses an object).   
We tested these questions in China and the US as part of a study of 
financial value estimations.79 Specifically, we tested the following 
variables, each with respect to financial value estimations :  (1) cultural 
differences; (2) framing effects and loss aversion; (3) morality effects; and 
(4) out-group bias.  Based on systematic psychological differences in 
cognitive orientations between Americans and Chinese, and because of the 
changing economic conditions in the US and China during the reference 
period of the study, we made the following predictions: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese will make different value estimations than 
Americans, a result consistent both with differing styles of judgment as well as 
with the dramatic socioeconomic changes in China over the past twenty years; 
and 
 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese value estimations will be more affected by 
                                                 
79 In addition to their differing cultural psychological profiles, these locations also 
represent two of the most interesting economic regions in the world. The US maintains a 
position as an economic power.  In China, the economic landscape has undergone 
substantial change as it has moved from a socialist planned economy to a capitalist market 
economy.  During that time, which began in 1978, China has enjoyed phenomenal growth 
and inflation. Since 1985, Chinese average annual inflation rates have been around 9.13% 
with two periods of double digits inflation growth from 1987-1990 and 1993-1995 (figures 
from Chinese National Bureau of Statis tics). During the same time period, the average 
annual inflation rates in the US have been relative stable, averaging 4.1% from 1985 to 
2004 (figures from NASA), when this study was conducted.   
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experimental manipulations to situational variables, given Chinese people’s 
higher level of holistic cognitions. Hence, Chinese people will show 
stronger framing (lose/find) effects, in-group vs out-group differences in 
value estimation, and stronger morality information effects than Americans.   
 
III.  THE EMPIRICAL STUDY- VALUE ESTIMATION ACROSS CULTURES 
 
A.  Methods 
Participants.  Two hundred thirty one Chinese participants participated 
in the study.   The average age for Chinese participants was 27.68 years old.  
Three hundred eighty four Americans participated in the study.  One 
hundred forty three of these American participants were Caucasian and one 
hundred eighty five were Asian-American.  Fifty six other Americans 
participated, but only seventeen listed their ethnicity.  The average age for 
Caucasian Americans was 21.59 years old.  The average age for Asian 
Americans was 20.39 old.  No significant differences emerged between 
Caucasian and Asian-American responses.   
Materials.  Participants were asked to jud ge the financial value of four 
objects (a gold ring, an antique chair, commemorative coins, and a 
municipal bond) when a value approximately 20 years prior had been given.  
By examining judgments of financial values of objects, we could 
simultaneously evaluate cognitive understandings of economic principles 
(such as inflation and return on investment) and test how situational factors 
(such as cognitive biases) may influence fundamental economic decision-
making across cultures.  The independent variables we tested included:  (1) 
culture (Chinese v. American) (2) frame (losing v. finding the object), (3) 
morality information about the actors (drug dealer, nurse, philanthropist, 
burglar), and (4) group identity (in-group and out-group membership), 
hence a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 design.  Depending upon the independent variable 
condition, participants read variations of the following stories: 
 
Lisa, a prostitute, was walking along the beach when she found a gold 
ring in the sand.  Unbeknownst to Lisa, the ring had been purchased in 
1985.  According to World Jeweler, an international jewelry appraisal 
publication, the ring was worth 100 Dollars at the time it was 
purchased. 
 
Jason, a social worker from your home town, recently moved to a new 
apartment.  When unpacking, he found an antique chair that was 
accidentally delivered to his house along with his belongings.  There is 
no tracking label or other identification information on the chair’s 
packaging, and the moving company tells him to keep the chair.  Jason 
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does not know how much the chair is worth.  However, an old issue of 
Antique Magazine indicates that the chair was worth 350 Dollars in 
1985.    
 
Glenn is a scientist who works for an illegal organization that designs 
the illegal synthetic drug ‘ice’.  Recently, Glenn moved into a new 
apartment.  When he was looking at the top of his closet for a place to 
store his extra belongings, he found a municipal bond that was 
purchased for 200 dollars in 1985.  The bond has not yet matured.  The 
bond does not have a name endorsed on it, so that anyone can keep it or 
cash it. 
 
David is a drug dealer.  He was recently walking in the park when he 
sat down on a bench to make a phone call.  Looking down, he noticed 
an envelope partially covered in dirt.  Opening the envelope, David 
found that the envelope contained rare commemorative coins.  David 
does not know how much the coins are worth.  David doesn’t know it, 
but in 1985 a collectibles auction house valued the coins at 500 Dollars. 
 
Participants in the “low moral” condition read stories about all low moral 
actors.  For example, instead of reading about Jason, a social worker, 
participants read about Jason, a burglar.  Participants in the “high moral” 
condition read stories about all good moral actors.  For example, instead of 
reading about Glenn, a scientist for an illegal drug manufacturer, 
participants read about Glenn, an AIDS researcher.  For the framing 
condition, half of the participants read stories about actors who found 
objects of value, such as in each of the examples above.  The other half of 
participants read stories about actors who lost the exact same objects of 
value.  For example, participants in the “low-moral lose” condition read the 
following story about David:   
 
David is a drug dealer.  He was recently walking in the park when he 
sat down on a bench to make a phone call.  As he sat down, an envelope 
containing rare commemorative coins slipped out of his pant pocket and 
onto the ground.  David had received the coins from a friend, but he did 
not know how much they were worth.  David doesn’t know it, but in 
1985 a collectibles auction house valued the coins at 500 Dollars. 
 
As a result, the only difference between the “lose” framed condition 
and “find” framed condition was the perspective presented. The 1985 
financial anchor was identical. 
 Materials were created in English with consideration for cross-
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cultural understanding of the concepts.  The 1985 financial anchor values 
were given to Americans in US Dollars and to Chinese in Chinese currency 
(RMB). The survey was translated into Mandarin Chinese by a bilingual 
research associate and back translated into English by a bilingual research 
assistant. Resolution of translation discrepancies was made by group 
consensus of the authors and translators.   
The dependent variable measured financial estimates of object 
values.80  Participants were given the following written instruction:  “Please 
give your best estimate of how much the coins are worth today.  Do not 
give a range.  Only give an exact amount.” In order to work with 
comparable value estimates, we converted raw dependent variable value 
estimation scores into a summary index that presents the ratio of value 
increase from the objects’ anchor value in 1985.  For example, a person that 
estimated the ring’s value to be $1,000 (recall that the ring’s value in 1985 
was $100) was converted to a 10.0 ratio, indicating that the current value of 
the item was estimated as 10 times greater than the 1985 value.   
Procedures.  We administered the questionnaires to students in China 
and the US.  American participants at a major public university participated 
as part of a psychology course credit requirement.  Chinese participants 
were recruited through the psychology department at a major public 
university in Beijing.  Participants in China were each paid a small amount 
to participate.   
 
B.  Results 
Cultural Differences in Value Estimations. The results show that 
Chinese estimated values of all four objects higher than Americans.  Figure 
1 illustrates the substantial cultural differences in people’s estimates of 
value for all four objects, and shows the mean value estimate ratios for each 
of the four objects, displayed by country. 
                                                 
80 Other dependent variable measures included judgments of property ownership.  See 
Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Owning Up to Cognitive Biases:  Extraneous 
Variables, Culture, and Property Ownership Judgments (unpublished manuscript, 2006, on 
file with authors). 
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Figure 1: Cultural Differences in Object Value Estimation Ratios 
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For the ring, Chinese estimations were 19.95 times the 1985 value 
while American estimations were only 4.70 times the 1985 value, F (1, 577) 
= 9.02 , p< .01.  For the antique chair, Chinese estimations were 12.02 times 
the 1985 value while American estimations were only 2.83 times the 1985 
value, F (1, 576) = 32.80, p<.001. For the bond, Chinese estimations were 
11.55 times the 1985 value while American estimations were only 4.90 
times the 1985 value, F (1, 575) = 20.61, p<.001. For the coins, Chinese 
estimations were 14.74 times the 1985 value while American estimations 
were only 3.99 times the 1985 value, F (1, 574) = 36.51, p<.001. We also 
combined each participant’s estimations across the four stories and 
generated a combined index for each participant.  We ran a 2*2*2*2 
Multivariate Analysis on this combined index and found main effects for 
culture such that Chinese made significantly higher value estimations than 
Americans, F (1, 578) = 39.57, p< .001. 
Table 1 displays the 1985 value anchors given to participants, as 
well as the inflation adjusted amounts81 and the raw American and Chinese 
value judgments for each of the four objects. When value judgments were 
adjusted for inflation in the two countries, the results indicated that, 
generally, Chinese still made higher value estimations than Americans, for 
                                                 
81 To calculate the inflation adjusted values, we used the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
for the US as provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.  For China, 
we used CPI figures as reported by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. 
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the chair, T (575) = 3.528, p< .001, and for the coins T (573) = 3.421, p = 
.001, and marginally for the ring, T (576) = 1.82, p= .071.82  The difference 
between inflation adjusted value estimations for the bond was not 
significant, a result that will be discussed below.  For example, for the value 
of the coins, Americans estimated an inflation-adjusted value of 2.28 times 
the 1985 value.  Chinese estimated an inflation-adjusted value of 4.72 times 
the 1985 value.  These results indicate that, even taking into account the 
vastly different inflation rates, Chinese generally perceived more 
appreciation in the value of the objects than Americans.  Table 2 displays 
the mean value ratios as scored by participants, as well as the inflation 
adjusted value ratios taking into account inflation in the two countries.   
 
Table 1 
 
Values Estimations by Country 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 Values    CPI Adjusted Values (2004) Value Estimations (2004) 
 (1985)    U.S.  China  U.S  China  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ring        100  175.60  321.31  469.97   1994.70 
 
Chair       350  614.60  1093.08  991.93  4206.27 
 
Bond       200   351.20  624.61  982.35      2310.92 
 
Coin        500  878.00   1561.54  2002.38  7371.79 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2 
 
Value Estimation Ratios (1985-2004) by Country 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
  Value Judgment Ratios  Ratios Adjusted for Inflation 
  U.S. China  U.S.  China  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ring          4.70  19.95  2.68  6.21 
 
Chair         2.83   12.02  1.61  3.85 
 
Bond         4.90  11.55  2.80  3.70 
 
Coin          3.99  14.75  2.28  4.72 
_____________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
82 For these t-tests, equal variances were not assumed. 
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Table 3 shows the value estimations in terms of annual percentage 
increase assumed from 1985 to 2004.  These results raise two interesting 
points.  First, they indicate that participants’ assumptions regarding object 
appreciation outpaced inflation, but did so in a somewhat modest way.  
Second, these results highlight how big the mean differences were between 
American and Chinese estimates.  For example, Americans estimated that 
the chair value increased by an average of under 6% per year.  Chinese 
estimated that the chair  value increased by an average of 14.81% per year.  
Americans estimated that the ring value increased by an average of 8.98%.  
Chinese estimated that the ring value increased by an average of 16.12% per 
year.  See Table 3 and Figure 2.   
 
Table 3 
 
Average Annual Assumed Percentage Appreciation by Country83 
_________________________________ 
    
    U.S. China    
__________________________________________________ 
 
Ring          8.98  18.09   
 
Chair  5.96   14.81     
 
Bond   9.25  14.56   
 
Coin          8.01  16.12 
_________________________________ 
 
There were some notable differences in value estimations between 
the objects.  Out of the four objects possible, Americans judged the bond as 
the highest appreciating object since 1985.  Chinese, however, judged the 
bond as the lowest appreciating object, perhaps indicating systematic 
cultural differences in the types of objects that are perceived as gaining the 
most value over time (which may have cross-cultural implications in 
expected investment return).  This phenomenon may explain the failure to 
find significant differences between Americans and Chinese on the inflation 
adjusted bond scores.  It is interesting to note that in both countries, bonds 
are government- issued securities, while the other objects are not.  Other 
                                                 
83 We calculated this assumed appreciation rate using the following formula:  Final 
value = Base value × (1 + X) n-1 ,  where Base value refers to the object value in 1985; Final 
value refers to the object value in 2004; X refers to assumed annual percentage of 
appreciation; N is 19 (from 1985 to 2004). 
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than with respect to bonds, Americans and Chinese agreed upon which 
objects appreciated the most.  Both Americans and Chinese believed that 
the gold ring appreciated more than the coins, which in turn appreciated 
more than the antique chair.  See Table 2.   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Assumed Annual Percentage of Appreciation by Country 
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Other Independent Variable Effects.  A MANOVA was conducted 
on the composite index to test main effects and interaction effects of all of 
the independent variables.  In addition to the main effect for culture, the 
results showed a main effect for the frame (lose/find) variable, such that 
participants who read about a person losing an item scored the item as more 
valuable (m= 13.14) than participants who read about a person finding the 
identical item (m= 6.18), F (1,578) = 14.56, p <.001.  See Figure 3.  This 
main effect is consistent with prospect theory in that losses loom larger than 
gains.  However, because this study tested intrinsic financial values (by 
asking the value of the object), rather than the perceived utility, our results 
indicate that prospect theory’s effects might in part derive from assumptions 
regarding intrinsic value rather than utility.  There were no main effects for 
the morality and in-group/out-group variables, though interaction effects did 
emerge.   
The MANOVA on the composite index indicated a significant 
interaction effect for the culture and framing (lose/find) variables.  This 
interaction effect appeared to demonstrate that much of the framing main 
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effects can be explained by an interaction with the culture variable, F (1, 
578) = 12.19, p = 001.  This interaction effect appeared to indicate that 
Chinese value estimations varied greatly based on the framing variable (m 
lose = 21.84; m find = 8.70), while American value estimations only varied 
slightly based on the framing variable (m lose = 4.25; m find = 3.67).  
Figure 3 shows the interaction effect between culture and the framing 
variable.  Interestingly, these results show that Chinese display framing and 
loss aversion patterns that are more consistent with prospect theory than 
American responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Framing Effects in Value Estimations 
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There was also a significant two way interaction for the in-
group/out-group variable and morality variable, F (1, 578) = 8.70, p < 01.  
This interaction effect appeared to show that participants scored object 
values as highest for low-moral in-group members (m = 13.31) and lowest 
for low-moral out-group members (m = 6.07).   
This interaction effect can be better explained by reference to two 
three way interactions:  group X morality X frame, and group X morality X 
culture.  The group X morality X frame effect on the composite index, F (1, 
578) = 8.58, p <. 01, suggested that the above two way interaction between 
group membership and morality was more salient for the loss condition than 
for the find condition.  In-group low moral actors and out-group high moral 
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actors who lost the objects received the highest value estimations. These 
results seem to suggest that people make value estimations based upon 
monetarily irrelevant information, including socially sensitive categories 
such as group membership.  
The three way interaction of group X morality X culture on the 
composite index, F (1, 573) = 7.62, p < .01, appeared to indicate that while 
US participant responses only varied slightly across morality and group, 
Chinese participant responses judged financial values much differently 
based on group and morality.  Chinese participants scored the highest 
values as those of low moral in-group members (m = 22.90).  The lowest 
values were of low moral out-group members (m = 8.00).  High moral out-
group members (m = 17.85) and high moral in-group members (m = 12.11) 
received value  scores in the middle.  Figure 4 shows the three way 
interaction of group X morality X culture and illustrates the large variance 
in Chinese value scores based on group and morality.  Once again, these 
results suggest not only that financial values can be very susceptible to 
seemingly irrelevant information, but also that Chinese are more sensitive 
than Americans to contextual information and variables.  See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:  Out-Group Effects, Morality Information, and Cultural Differences  
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IV.  DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS:  BRIDGING BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
The primary objectives of our empirical study were to examine cultural 
differences and the influence of (both relevant and irrelevant) contextual 
factors on people’s financial values estimates.  The study demonstrated that 
there are dramatic cultural differences in the ways that people make financial 
estimates.  In general, Chinese estimated object values as much higher than 
Americans and did so by a large margin. Initially, these results might appear to 
be consistent with economic conditions—China has witnessed more inflation 
than America over the past twenty years.  Yet even adjusting for the uneven 
inflation rates did not explain our results.  Chinese still assumed higher object 
appreciation than Americans did.  The reason for this fundamental difference in 
value estimations is initially unclear.  One possibility is that Chinese responses 
more accurately reflect Chinese financial conditions than the published 
inflation rates in China.  However, such a possibility is difficult to account for 
and measure.   
Consistent with psychological theory proposing models of East Asian 
holistic rationality, our findings also show that Chinese people were more 
sensitive to our behavioral experimental manipulations. Contextual 
information, such as framing effects, an actor’s morality, and group 
membership affected participants’ estimates of financial value, particularly for 
Chinese.  Group membership and morality information have long been 
implicitly assumed by economists to be irrelevant to the financial values of 
given objects.  However, this study found that such experimental manipulations 
do affect value estimates, and that the strength and persistence of these effects 
on financial value estimates depends upon the cultural background of the 
people making financial judgments.   
   The fact that financial value estimations are susceptible to 
contextual variation, such as framing effects, group membership and 
morality information implies that value estimations are not solely guided by 
the intrinsic value of the property combined with economic conditions.  
Instead, our results indicate that financial value estimations are a function of 
four factors:  the perceived intrinsic value of the objects, the social and 
situational characteristics of the object possessor, the culture of the 
perceiver, and contextual factors (such as socioeconomic conditions or 
supply and demand).  In order to understand the value of objects, one has to 
understand all four components.  This holistic approach is perhaps most 
relevant for understanding the value estimations of East Asians.  In fact, 
such a holistic model of economic rationality is consistent with cultural 
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psychological theories of East Asian epistemologies. 
While we do suggest that a universalistic approach to financial 
principles would be better guided by reference to cultural variation, we are 
not suggesting that the basic principles of behavioral finance and behavioral 
economics are wrong.  Rather, the results of this study show that certain 
elements of prospect theory are valid.  For instance, the frame (lose/find) 
variable showed that framing effects and loss aversion operate in value 
estimations.  People valued objects framed as lost to be more valuable than 
objects framed as found.  Still, the cultural difference existed there as well. 
Chinese made much higher estimations for objects lost than objects found, 
particularly when the people who lost the objects were low moral out-group 
members.    
Understanding how individuals estimate the financial va lue of given 
objects is relevant to the basic assumptions of modern behavioral, social, 
and economic sciences.  Few previous studies have examined individuals’ 
financial value estimating behavior across cultural groups and situational 
conditions.  This study found that cultures differ in their value estimations, 
as well as their tendency to take social and contextual information into 
account when making those estimations. These cultural differences may 
lead to real life economic and business implications-- in international 
business transactions, in understanding economic incentives and self 
interest, in corporate strategic planning, in evaluating asset portfolios and 
investments, and in legal decision-making. 
Like the economic sciences that it embraces, scho larship in 
behavioral law and economics should embrace culture as an important 
variable in decision-making.  Though previous studies have begun to 
suggest that cultural variation must be understood as a systematic influence 
in decision-making, 84 most behavioral economic scholarship continues to 
assume that deviations from expected utility are systematic.  But as our 
results have demonstrated, all people do not deviate from expected utility in 
the same way.  Scholarship in behavioral law and economics thus sits at an 
interesting crossroads.  It properly embraces the role of humanity and 
human thought in the law and it actively seeks to improve models of law by 
adding an understanding of the way people think.  But it fails to recognize 
that the human understand ing it embraces is at best a Western-only human 
understanding.85  
                                                 
84 See Licht, supra  note __; Mitchell, supra  note __; Levinson & Peng, supra  note __; 
Levinson, supra  note ___; Rachlinski, supra  note ___.   
85 It may, however, be a Western human understanding that ignores not just 
international differences, but even the cultural diversity within Western societies.  Such 
cultural diversity, within an increasingly diverse United States for example, would be better 
reflected with a culturally competent model of behavioral economics.   
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V: DEBIASING THROUGH CULTURAL COMPETENCY 
Beyond its descriptive promise for building accurate behavioral 
models, cultural psychological knowledge holds promise for debiasing efforts.  
There are two ways in which understanding cultural psychological influences 
on decision-making can improve legal reform efforts:  through cultural training 
and through model building.  
Cultural Training.  One straightforward way to harness culture’s 
debiasing potential is to develop methods of cross-cultural training-- exposing 
and immersing people into known cultural environments.86  Every human 
grows up inside a cultural environment that is loaded with culture-specific 
assumptions,87 worldviews,88 modes of psychological functioning,89 modes of 
reasoning,90 patterns of judgment and decision making,91 implicit theories of 
the self and the world,92 and more.  A debiasing cultural training program 
would immerse debiasing candidates in cultural systems selected to leverage 
cultural knowledge and broaden cultural awareness of cognitive and decision 
alternatives.   Though cultural training has not been suggested as a debiasing 
tool in behavioral economics, the concept of cultural training is not new to the 
law.  Cultural training programs of different sorts have been proposed by 
commentators in a variety of legal arenas, including legal counseling, 93 racial 
                                                 
86 Cross-cultural training programs are quite common to areas outside of the law, and 
have flourished recently in the international business community.  A basic web search 
reveals scores of companies marketing themselves as cultural training progra ms, including 
“culturalsavvy.com” (which “offers a variety of customizable training programs and 
workshops,” www.culturalsavvy.com, last visited 4/22/06) and 
“culturesmartconsulting.com,” (which “offers face to face international management skills 
training, cross cultural training, diversity and change management, international business 
briefings, language training, cross cultural profiling…,” www.culturesmartconsulting.com, 
last visited 4/22/06). 
87 C. STRAUSS & N. QUINN, A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING (1997). 
88 DAN SPERBER, THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BELIEFS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
STUDY OF WIDESPREAD BELIEFS (1990). 
89 GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE 'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
WORK-RELATED VALUES (1980); PETER B. SMITH & MICHAEL H. BOND, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES (1999); TRIANDIS, supra  note __. 
90 DOROTHY HOLLAND & NAOMI QUINN, CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND 
THOUGHT  (1987); STEPHEN STICH, THE FRAGMENTATION OF REASON (1990). 
91 Nisbett et al., supra  note __; J. F. Yates & J. Lee, Chinese Decision-Making, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CHINESE PSYCHOLOGY (Michael H. Bond, ed. 1996). 
92 Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions: 
A World from Two Perspectives. 6 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 267 (1995); Kaiping Peng et al., 
Culture and Human Inference: Perspectives from Three Traditions,  in HANDBOOK OF 
CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 243 (D. Masumoto, ed., 2001). 
93 Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling , 27 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 345 (1997); (focusing on client-
centered counseling training).   
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discrimination,94 juvenile justice,95 and others.96      
Though debiasing by culture has not been attempted in behavioral 
economics, recent research indicates that people shift their cognitive 
orientations when immersed temporarily in another culture.  This  change in 
cultural cognitive orientation occurred during an international exchange when a 
group of American lawyers traveled to China for four weeks.  During their 
visit, they were taught by Chinese scholars, lived with Chinese counterparts 
and discussed Chinese legal issues with Chinese lawyers.  Before and after the 
cultural immersion, Wang and his colleagues tested cognitive cultural 
orientations using a measure of individualism and collectivism designed by 
Triandis97 and a measure of dialectical thinking designed by Rodgers, Peng and 
their colleagues.98 Results suggested that many of the Americans became at 
least temporarily more collectivistic in their values and cognitive orientations.99  
The results of the China immersion project offer hope that cross-
cultural knowledge of cognitive patterns can be used to debias.  For example, 
suppose that we want to temporarily debias the endowment effect in a group of 
Americans.100  Our review of cognitive biases across cultures, supra Section 
IIC, described how the endowment effect may depend upon a person’s or 
culture’s sense of individual or group ownership.101  This research by 
Carnevale is our first debiasing clue—that ownership expectations, a 
phenomenon upon which the endowment effect is dependent, are different 
across individuals with different cultural orientations.102   
Our next debiasing clue comes from Markus and Kitayama,103 who 
                                                 
94 Joe Feagin et al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of Middle-Class 
African Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313 n123 (2001) (citing a variety of works that have 
called for cultural training in order to reduce racial bias by psychotherapists). 
95 Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Culture 
Differences and the Right to Treatment, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 573 (1998) (discussing cultural 
competence and “cultural awareness training” in juvenile correctional facilities). 
96 Ramon N. Valle, Ethics, Ethnicity, and Dementia: A "Culture-Fair" Approach to 
Bioethical Advocacy in Dementing Illness, 35 GA. L. REV. 465, 482-83 (2001)(discussing 
cultural competence and training in the context of bioethics). 
97 TRIANDIS, supra  note __. 
98 Julie Rodgers et al., Dialectical Self and Psychological Well-Being. 30 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1416 (2004). 
99 Frank Wang, Laura Young & Kaiping Peng, Teaching Cultures, (manuscript under 
preparation at Kenneth Wang School of Law, Suzhou University (2006)). 
100 Published reports have indicated only limited success in debiasing the endowment 
effect.  Arlen and her colleagues, however, reported success in eliminating the endowment 
effect simply by changing corporate agency orientations.  Arlen et. al, supra  note __.   See 
also  Jolls & Sunstein, supra  note __ for a discussion of Arlen and her colleagues’ findings.     
101 Carnevale, supra  note __.  
102 The results from our own research also show this difference in ownership 
expectations.  See Levinson & Peng, supra  note __.    
103 Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and Self: Implications for 
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suggested that American self concepts tend be independent while East Asian 
self concepts tend to be interdependent.  According to Markus and Kitayama, 
American independence “requires construing oneself as an individual whose 
behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one’s 
own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings and action, rather than by 
reference to the thoughts, feelings and actions of others.”104 In contrast, East 
Asian interdependence entails “seeing oneself as part of an encompassing 
social relationship and recognizing that one’s behaviour is determined, 
contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to be 
the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship.”105  
Based on this fundamental cultural difference, one can predict that for 
members of independent cultures, an individual’s self concept will be defined 
by both internal traits and external expressions (such as possessions, styles, and 
unique behaviors).106  Possession of personal property could thus become an 
important measure of self-worth.  Given individualist societies’ tendencies to 
encourage individual’s self-enhancement,107 one can understand the 
(unconscious) psychological desire to inflate the value of one’s possessions.  
On the other hand, if the self is defined in relation to others (as it is in Asian 
cultures), possessions would be more likely to be viewed as part of group 
relations, and thus the value of personal property would not be directly 
diagnostic of one’s self worth.  Such is the precise rational behind Carnevale’s 
group endowment effect.108 If a brief cultural immersion can change 
Americans’ cognitive cultural orientation to be more like Asian interdependent 
selves, as it did in Wang and his colleagues’ experiment in China109, then the 
endowment effect can similarly be debiased.110 
Model Building and Legal Debiasing.  Imagine a behavioral model so 
accurate that it could not only identify all cognitive biases, but also could 
explain why they function in certain cultural groups but not others.  This model 
                                                                                                                            
Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,  98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224 (1991). 
104 Id. at 226. 
105 Id. at 227. 
106 See id. 
107 Steven J. Heine et al., Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard? 106 
PSYCHOL. REV. 766 (1999). 
108 The group endowment effect might also serve as another explanation of Arlen et 
al.’s successful debiasing research project, because shifting a person’s domain or cognitive 
reference from an individual possession to corporate possession is analogous to individual 
versus group property.  See Arlen et al., supra  note __.  For more on the effect of cognitive 
reference points in legal-decision making, see Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the 
Expression of Community Values in Juries:  How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters 
the Way People Think , 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005)(arguing that placing citizens on 
juries alters their cognitive reference points and therefore changes their decision-making). 
109 See Wang et al., supra  note __.   
110 The authors are in the process of testing this proposition.   
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could give behavioral and legal scholars a pan-universal understanding of 
human behavior,111 an understanding that will allow focus more on the 
interaction between law and behavior than on correcting cognitive biases.  In a 
world with such a model, debiasing would not be needed because biases could 
be avoided, embraced, combined, changed, or perhaps even disappear through 
cultural transcendence.  The ultimate debiasing tool, then, is not temporary 
cultural training but an accurate, complete and culturally adept behavioral 
model of human decision-making.   
Not surprisingly, developing a complete behavioral model is a massive 
task.  Nonetheless, treating cultural variation as statistical noise will ensure the 
continuation of current gaps in behavioral knowledge-- knowledge that could 
tell us something useful about humanity, and therefore about law.  As we have 
demonstrated in this Article, cultural differences are not noise but meaningful 
information that can help us develop more precise behavioral models that are 
representative of human populations.112  In fact, examining cultural variation in 
biases can ultimately lead to an understanding of the origins as well as the 
cognitive functions of the biases.  Temporary debiasing measures, on the other 
hand, tend to focus researchers’ efforts more on tasks as repetitive solutions113 
than on understanding the bias itself.  Once researchers can understand why all 
people do not display the same biases, solutions begin to arise.  It is not 
difficult to learn under such a cross-cultural model:  in every cross-cultural 
study of a bias, there are a limited number of possible cultural variations.114  In 
each case, we learn about the bias.  Cross-cultural work will therefore enable us 
not only to understand biases themselves, but will allow us to explore other 
cognitive limitations, discover novel behavioral phenomena, and develop a 
culturally competent model of humanity. 
 
                                                 
111 The universality in our pan-universal model is not the same universality that we 
have been criticizing—the assumption that all cultures think in the same way.  We use the 
term to describe shared characteristics of the human species as a whole. Our belief in a 
potentially pan-universal model is based on the fact that there are similar universal laws in 
a variety of related disciplines. For example, in biology there are well-established pan-
species primary needs (such as eating, drinking, sleeping) even though their fulfillment is 
achieved in very different ways in different species .  In anthropology there are universal 
customs (such as tool making). In behavioral legal scholarship, it is therefore plausible to 
assume that we will also uncover pan-universal patterns of human behavior, even though 
there will likely be wide variation across cultures in the ways in which these universal 
patterns are developed, displayed, and deployed. 
112 For other discussions of solutions through cultural knowledge, see Levinson & 
Peng, supra  note __ at 225; Levinson, supra  note __ at 28.   
113 With such repetitive solutions, researchers always face the possibility that the 
debiasing measure will no longer work. 
114 There are three: (1) one culture shows bias and the other does not; (2) both cultures 
show different degrees of the bias; and (3) both cultures show the bias. 
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VI:  CONCLUSION:  A CULTURAL SOLUTION? 
Culture should be embraced as an important factor in models of 
economic decision-making.  Across a variety of cognitive domains, and as 
demonstrated by our own study, people make economic decisions in vastly 
different ways based upon their culture, the frame, as well as situational 
information provided.  At the least, these findings indicate that culture must 
be embraced as an important variable in behavioral economic models.  Yet 
we believe that the importance of cultural understanding goes beyond 
simply generating models of deviation from rational economic behavior.  
Incorporating cultural competence into behavioral economics can provide 
clues that will help legal scholars not just understand human cognitions 
more fully, but also help them conceptualize the law’s prescriptive response 
to cognitive biases.  After all, if cultural diversity can potentially solve 
genetically caused challenges115, perhaps it can help solve behavioral ones. 
 
 
                                                 
115 See NATURE, supra  note __.   
